Utah Law Review
Volume 2022

Number 1

Article 5

1-2022

A Sand County Tax Shelter: Syndicated Conservation Easements
and Their Toll on the American Taxpayer
Jimmy Godin
S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, jimmy.godin@law.utah.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Land Use Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jimmy Godin, A Sand County Tax Shelter: Syndicated Conservation Easements and Their Toll on the
American Taxpayer, 2022 ULR 213 (2022). https://doi.org/10.26054/0d-vcfv-fbkr

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Law Review by an authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

A SAND COUNTY TAX SHELTER: SYNDICATED CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS AND THEIR TOLL ON THE AMERICAN TAXPAYER
Jimmy Godin*
Abstract
The conservation easement is a powerful tool for conserving private land
in the United States and beyond. Among the many incentives
for encouraging conservation easement donations are tax deductions,
which largely depend on the conservation value of the donated land. But
groups of wealthy taxpayers, accountants, attorneys, and appraisers are
manipulating the conservation easement tax framework and receiving
large tax deductions for conservation easements that are practically
worthless in a conservation sense—transactions known as 'syndicated
conservation easements.' Syndicated conservation easements have
generated substantial controversy, in part because they cost American
taxpayers billions of tax dollars annually. While the Internal Revenue
Service, the United States Department of Justice, members of Congress,
and conservation groups are attempting to crack down on syndicated
conservation easements, their efforts to curb the practice remain
ineffective. This Note first examines the conservation easement tax
framework and considers the ways in which it enables syndicated
conservation easements. Next, this Note describes the measures taken
against syndicated conservation easements and analyzes how such
measures have fallen short. Finally, this Note contemplates more effective
ways to uncover syndicated conservation easements and curb such
transactions entirely. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Service must
streamline its auditing efforts to focus on appraisals, while the United
States Department of Justice must impose harsher penalties on those
involved in syndicated conservation easements. Similarly, Congress must
create a more effective system for appraisal oversight and should enact
legislation that alters the existing tax framework in a way that
disincentivizes wealthy taxpayers from engaging in syndicated
conservation easements altogether. Lastly, individual conservation
groups must work together to create a more uniform set of standards and
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practices for conservation easement donation, while state legislators
should strive to create uniformity in state conservation easement tax law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Conservation will ultimately boil down to rewarding the private
landowner who conserves the public interest.
—Aldo Leopold1
The conservation easement is a powerful tool for conserving private land,2 and
the practice of donating one’s land to help conserve the public interest is now a
critical component of the conservation movement at large—as predicted by
renowned American conservationist Aldo Leopold. Recently, this practice has
generated substantial controversy in part due to groups of wealthy taxpayers,
realtors, appraisers, accountants, and lawyers who abuse the practice for tax
purposes.3 Most notably, these groups receive substantial tax deductions for
donating lands with little or no conservation value, a transaction known as the
syndicated conservation easement.4 At first glance, these transactions may appear as
valid conservation easements and thus go undetected. When analyzed more closely,
syndicated conservation easements are exposed for what they really are: mere tax
shelters that contribute little to land conservation in the United States.
This Note begins with a broad overview of conservation easements and the
conservation easement tax framework, then moves to a synopsis of syndicated
conservation easements and the efforts to combat them, and concludes by evaluating
more effective ways in which stakeholders could extinguish syndicated conservation
easements altogether. Specifically, this Note argues that the IRS must streamline its
auditing efforts and impose harsher penalties on those involved in syndicated
conservation easement schemes. Furthermore, while some members of Congress
pursue legislation that would deter wealthy taxpayers from investing in syndicated
conservation easements, they must also address the lack of uniformity in state
conservation easement tax law, urge a legally mandated set of standards and
practices, and create more effective systems for appraisal oversight.

1

Aldo Leopold, Conservation Economics, in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD 193,
202 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicott eds., 1991).
2
See, e.g., Richard J. Roddewig, Conservation Easements & Their Critics: Is
Perpetuity Truly Forever . . . and Should It Be?, 52 UIC J. MARSHALL L. REV. 677, 677–79
(2019) (discussing the impact of the conservation easement movement).
3
See, e.g., Adam Looney, Estimating the Rising Cost of a Surprising Tax Shelter,
BROOKINGS: UP FRONT (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2017/12/20/estimating-the-rising-cost-of-a-surprising-tax-shelter-the-syndicatedconservation-easement/ [https://perma.cc/Z4TY-B9A4] (assessing the federal cost of
syndicated conservation easements).
4
See infra Section II.D for an explanation of the dynamics underlying syndicated
conservation easements.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Easements and Conservation Easements
In its most basic form, an easement is a nonpossessory interest in land. One of
the most common examples of this type of property right is a right of way through
someone else’s property.5 In this instance, the easement holder has the right to cross
the property but is not conferred any other rights such as ownership, possession, or
the right to exclude others. This type of easement is an affirmative easement.
Negative easements, on the other hand, “convey the right to prohibit some use of the
affected parcel.”6 An illustration of a negative easement is as follows: Landowner A
and Landowner B are neighbors. Landowner A has a magnificent view of the
surrounding foothills, but this view would be impeded if Landowner B constructs
any tall structures on her property. Landowner A and Landowner B agree to meet
and discuss an arrangement where Landowner A can continue to enjoy their view of
the surrounding foothills despite Landowner B’s adjacent property. After some
negotiation, Landowner B agrees to grant a negative easement to Landowner A that
prohibits Landowner B from building any structures over twenty feet in height on
her own property. In this case, Landowner A is the negative easement holder and
has no property rights to Landowner B’s land, other than the guarantee that
Landowner B will not build structures over twenty feet in height on her property.
Consequently, Landowner B’s property is the affected parcel.
A conservation easement is another type of negative easement. While there is
no singular, legally operative definition of a conservation easement, it is understood
as a “legal agreement[] between a landowner and another party, generally a land
trust or government agency, that permanently restricts the development and/or use
of land with the purpose of achieving certain conservation or preservation goals.”7
Put simply, it restricts a specific parcel or section of land from being developed in
certain ways.
Conservation easements are made more complex by the variety of outcomes
they seek to achieve and the methods used to achieve them. In theory, the negative
easement in the previous example is similar to a conservation easement. There was
a specific preservation outcome, such as maintaining Landowner A’s view of the
surrounding foothills, and a distinct method to achieve that outcome, i.e. prohibiting
Landowner B from building structures over twenty feet in height. Some conservation
easements have distinct methods and outcomes (as in the previous example),8 but
5

Joan M. Youngman, Taxing and Untaxing Land: Open Space and Conservation
Easements, TAX ANALYSTS: SPECIAL REP. 747, 747–48 (Sept. 11, 2006),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/1171_youngman_easements.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MG6P-SZUH].
6
Id. at 748.
7
United States v. Zak, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1367–68 (N.D. Ga. 2019).
8
See, e.g., Anna Berry, Beyond Planned Gifts: Could Your Last Gift Be Your Burial
Site?, NONPROFIT Q. (Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing Larkspur Conservation’s efforts to create
Tennessee’s first ever “conservation burial ground”).
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many have broad, multi-faceted methods and outcomes, like creating “open space”
to be used for “park or recreational purposes, . . . conservation of land or other natural
resources, . . . historic or scenic purposes, . . . community development, . . . [or]
wetlands.”9 The method in this example—creating “open space”—is as
multitudinous as the desired outcomes of the conservation easement.
The contexts in which conservation easements are created add another
component to the conservation easement equation. Some conservation easements
are created to ensure that a working farm will continue to be used for agricultural
purposes, even after the landowners perish and the property is either inherited or
sold to a third party.10 In this instance, the farmer will work with “a qualified
conservation organization or public agency”11 to establish conservation easement
terms, such as which land uses will be allowed and which will be prohibited.12 While
many conservation easements are donated by the landowner, “[s]ome . . . are
purchased either in whole or in part, often with funds from federal, state, or local
conservation easement programs.”13 Gallatin County in Montana, for example, has
an “open space bond” which appropriates $10 million in funding for the acquisition
of land and conservation easements.14 Conservation easements can last any duration,
but conservation easements lasting “in perpetuity” appear to be the most common.15
In sum, conservation easements are negative easements that restrict
development and are complicated by the wide range of goals they seek to achieve
and the contexts from which they arise. Ultimately, conservation easements afford
landowners and easement holders abundant latitude in tailoring property agreements
that align with each party’s desired conservation outcomes. But why would a
landowner choose to attach a conservation easement to their property if it limits what
they can do with their property?
B. Conservation Easements and the Coinciding Tax Framework
In part, the answer to the previous question lies in the tax framework
surrounding conservation easements. While there are several non-monetary benefits
9

Virginia Open-Space Land Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1700 (2006).
See Protect Your Land, FARMLAND INFORMATION CENTER, https://farmlandinfo.org/
protect-your-land/ [https://perma.cc/Y8UE-NDX5] (last visited June 1, 2021) (describing
agricultural conservation easements (ACEs)).
11
Id.
12
See id. (“In general, ACEs limit subdivision, non-farm development and other uses
of land that are incompatible with farming.”).
13
Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, An Introduction to Conservation
Easements in the United States: A Simple Concept and a Complicated Mosaic of Law, 1 J.L.
PROP. & SOC’Y 107, 112 (2015).
14
See generally Open Lands Board: Conservation Easements, GALLATIN CNTY.
https://gallatincomt.virtualtownhall.net/open-lands-board/pages/conservation-easements
[https://perma.cc/3XYN-MFNU] (last visited June 1, 2021) (describing the county’s “open
space bond” program).
15
Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 113.
10
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for donating a conservation easement, this Note focuses only on the tax incentives
associated with conservation easement donations because such incentives are the
primary drivers for syndicated conservation easements.16 Before examining the tax
benefits of conservation easements, it is important to understand how conservation
easements emerged in the United States, how they became part of the tax code, and
their relevance in current land conservation efforts.
1. A History of Conservation Easements
Conservation easements emerged in the mid-twentieth century but were not
recognized as conservation easements during this time. The practice began in the
southeastern United States when the National Park Service purchased nearly 6,000
acres of easements to protect scenic vistas along the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace
Parkways.17 Around the same time, Congress enacted the Federal Highway
Beautification Act, which required states to allot three percent of their federal
highway funds to landscaping and scenic enhancement projects, or such funds would
lapse. 18 This Act ultimately incentivized states to develop their own scenic highway
easement programs.19 While states continued to enact “easement enabling statutes”
that “authorized the use of conservation easements to accomplish a broader range of
land conservation goals,”20 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) announced that
landowners who donate easements for conservation purposes may be eligible for tax
deductions.21 This announcement ushered in a series of IRS actions22 that eventually
led to the codification of conservation easements in the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C) in 1980.23 Pursuant to I.R.C. § 170(h), a conservation easement donor could
now receive a tax deduction generally equal to the value of the land donated.24
Shortly after, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(now the Uniform Law Commission) promulgated the Uniform Conservation

16

See infra Section II.C.
See Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 115 n.15 (noting how the federal
government ultimately discontinued this practice because of legal and political difficulties,
instead utilizing a “fee simple purchase program”).
18
Federal Highway Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (1965); see also 23
U.S.C. § 319.
19
Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 115–16.
20
Id. at 116 (“The earliest easement enabling statutes were enacted by California in
1959 and New York in 1960. By 1979, 40 states had enacted some type of conservation
easement enabling statute.” (internal citations omitted)).
21
See Roddewig, supra note 2, at 679–84 (discussing the cultural and political context
surrounding the emergence of conservation easements).
22
See Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62; Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 13, at
116–17.
23
See I.R.C. § 170(h) (containing the federal tax law for conservation easement
donations).
24
See id.
17
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Easement Act (UCEA), which is “generally considered the dominant source for state
statutory conservation easement law.”25
With conservation easements becoming solidified in both the IRC and state law,
the practice of donating easements as a means to receive tax benefits surged in
popularity,26 especially among the wealthy.27 Billionaire philanthropists like Ted
Turner bought numerous “trophy ranches” around mountain communities and
donated conservation easements on these ranches to preserve the land’s scenic and
natural character.28 While the validity of these conservation easements is not
disputed, this trend signified that donating conservation easements on large parcels
of land—and receiving substantial tax deductions—would appeal to wealthy
taxpayers.
Nonetheless, conservation easements were popular with more than only the
wealthy. Indeed, conservation organizations also depended on the practice to
preserve land. The number of land trusts, or charitable organizations whose mission
is to acquire and steward conservation easement lands,29 grew steadily and
dramatically, only leveling out recently.30 With the surge in popularity came the
demand for an organization that could oversee the conservation easement
movement. Thus, the Land Trust Alliance (LTA) was formed and remains the
foremost overseeing body of land trusts to this day.31 The LTA is not the only major
25

Cheever & Mclaughlin, supra note 13, at 117–18; see generally UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT (amended 2007) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1981).
26
Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 117–18 (discussing the significance of
I.R.C. § 170(h) and the UCEA’s role in facilitating the emergence of conservation
easements).
27
See Roddewig, supra note 2, at 686.
28
See id. (explaining the ‘trophy ranch’ phenomenon); S. REP. NO. 106-267, at 30
(2000) (defining a trophy ranch as: “a premium property available to only the wealthiest of
buyers who can afford to enjoy the amenities of a property without necessarily deriving
sufficient income from it to offset their investment or operating costs. These ranch properties
appeal to an affluent segment of society who have exceptional buyer power and a desire for
exclusivity and seclusion with a ranch having a high degree of ‘ambiance.’”).
29
See What Is a Land Trust?, WECONSERVEPA, https://conservationtools.org/guides/
150-what-is-a-land-trust [https://perma.cc/N7LM-MRQ8] (last visited June 1, 2021) (“A
land trust is a charitable organization that acquires land or conservation easements, or that
stewards land or easements, to achieve one or more conservation purposes.”).
30
Nancy A. McLaughlin, Perpetual Conservation Easements in the 21st Century: What
Have We Learned and Where Should We Go from Here?, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 687, 690 graph
1 (2013). Beginning in 1980, only approximately 128,000 acres were under conservation
easements; in only thirty years, that number rose to approximately 8.8 million acres. See id.
at 691 graph 2.
31
See Roddewig, supra note 2, at 683–84 (discussing the LTA’s origins). See generally
About Us, LAND TR. ALLIANCE, https://www.landtrustalliance.org/about-us [https://perma.
cc/3Q8B-9ZD5] (last visited June 1, 2021) (noting LTA’s history, vision, and mission);
LAND TR. ALLIANCE, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT (2018), https://s3.amazonaws.com/landtrust
alliance.org/2018AnnualReport-LandTrustAlliance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UNR-F7R8]
(providing an overview of LTA’s operations).
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charitable organization focusing primarily on the conservation easement as a tool
for land protection. The Nature Conservancy, for instance, currently holds 3.1
million acres of conservation easements in forty-nine states,32 while the Trust for
Public Land aids communities and stakeholders in acquiring conservation easements
for park land and open space.33 As of 2014, 105,000 conservation easements in the
United States encompassed approximately forty million acres, an area that was
roughly half the total acreage of the National Parks and approximately equal in size
to the state of Washington.34
On a national scale, conservation easements are instrumental in securing private
property for conservation purposes, but since conservation easement donations
result in tax deductions, they cost American taxpayers a substantial amount of
money. In fact, tax deductions resulting from the donation of conservation
easements cost the federal government between $1.6 to $2.9 billion annually,
ranking among the largest federal environmental and land programs in the budget.35
C. Conservation Easement Tax Code, Valuations, and Tax Deductions
To understand why wealthy taxpayers abuse the practice of donating
conservation easements by engaging in syndicated conservation easements, it is
important to first understand how tax deductions operate within the conservation
easement tax framework.
1. The Tax Code
Section 170(h) allows tax deductions for any “qualified conservation
contribution,”36 which is a contribution of a qualified real property interest, to a
qualified organization exclusively for conservation purposes.37 There are several
“real qualified property interests,” but the most relevant (for syndicated conservation
easement purposes) and disputed type of “qualified real property interest” is a

32
See How We Work: Private Lands Conservation, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY,
https://www.nature.org/en-us/about-us/who-we-are/how-we-work/private-landsconservation/ [https://perma.cc/MKA4-QFP6] (last visited June 6, 2021).
33
Frequently Asked Questions, THE TR. FOR PUB. LAND, https://www.tpl.org/frequently
-asked-questions-0#q4 [https://perma.cc/QCS6-A3PL] (last visited June 1, 2021).
34
See Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 109–10 (referencing data from the
National Conservation Easement Database, United States Department of Interior, and NPS).
35
See Looney, supra note 3 (comparing the annual cost of conservation easement tax
deductions to other federal environmental and land program budgets (e.g., the Bureau of
Land Management ($1.2 billion), the Fish and Wildlife Service ($1.6 billion), and the NPS
($3.0 billion)).
36
I.R.C. § 170(h).
37
I.R.C. § 170(h)(1).
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“perpetual use restriction over real property,”38 as demonstrated in a previous
example.39 Such contributions must be made to a qualified organization. Land trusts
with a 501(c)(3)40 nonprofit status are obvious examples of qualified organizations,
but there are many other nonprofit organizations that may qualify,41 as well as
federal, state, or local governmental entities, or public charities.42 These
contributions must be made “exclusively for conservation purposes,”43 which is
generally defined as preservation, either of land, species, open space, farmland, or
historic sites.44 Appraisers assume an important role in conservation easement
donations, and the value of a conservation easement tax deduction largely depends
upon their appraisals. As such, “the rules for qualified appraisers and appraisals . . .
also apply to conservation easement donations.”45
2. The Valuation Process
Syndicated conservation easements exist largely because taxpayers have found
ways to exploit and manipulate the conservation easement valuation process.
Therefore, understanding how this process works is vital in understanding how
syndicated conservation easements function and go undetected or unpunished.
In practice, a landowner works out the details of a potential conservation
easement with a charitable organization and, once satisfied with its overall terms,
agrees to donate a parcel of the landowner’s property in the form of a conservation

38
Anson H. Asbury, Understanding the Conservation Easement Tax Deduction (or
“Strawberry Fields Forever”), THE FED. LAW. 26, 29 (March 2016), https://www.fedbar.
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Easement-pdf-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCS6-A3PL].
39
See infra Section II.A.
40
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
41
See, e.g., DAVID MARRONE, DUCKS UNLIMITED, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS:
PROTECTION IN PERPETUITY 7, https://www.ducks.org/media/Conservation/Conservation_
Documents/_documents/ConservationEasmentBrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KLE-Q8Z3]
(last visited June 1, 2021) (outlining Ducks Unlimited’s conservation easement program in
FAQ form).
42
See ADAM LOONEY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 13 (May 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/upload
s/2017/05/looney_conservationeasements.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C6E-3XSA]; see also id. at
8 n.3 (“To qualify as a public charity, an organization must have broad public support. Most
charities qualify by receiving at least one-third of its support from contributions from the
general public and/or from receipts from activities related to its tax-exempt purpose.
Organizations that fail to meet that threshold—such as when one individual, family, or
organization provides a large share of the contributions—are private foundations and
governed by stricter rules intended to prevent against self-dealing.”).
43
I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(c).
44
See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4).
45
Asbury, supra note 38, at 29 (citing I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(i)–(ii)).
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easement.46 In many instances, the terms of a conservation easement prevent
development altogether or at the very least limit the amount a landowner may
develop on that donated section of their property. As a result, the landowner foregoes
any potential return or benefit they could have received by developing that land.
This opportunity cost is recognized in the form of a tax deduction, which generally
is equal to the difference between the entire property’s “development potential” (or
its “most valuable economic use . . . possible under the circumstances”)47 and the
value of the entire property once encumbered by the easement.48 This method of
valuation is referred to as the “before and after” method.49 This value is subject to
limitations50 but can be significant depending on the property’s development
potential.51
The valuation process is the single most important step in determining the
magnitude of a tax deduction, and taxpayers interested in donating a conservation
easement must follow certain valuation rules and appraisal standards.52 While the
regulations provide that the preferred method of calculating the value of a
conservation easement is the “sales of comparable easement” method,53 or
comparing the value of the conservation easement in question with other similar
conservation easements, this method is almost never used due to the complex and
dynamic nature of individual conservation easements.54 Instead, the “before and
46

Charitable organizations often spend a substantial amount of time building
relationships with potential conservation easement donors, and the process of acquiring
conservation easements can span years. See, e.g., Donating an Easement, VT. LAND TR.,
https://vlt.org/donate-easement [https://perma.cc/9T3T-VR5J] (last visited June 1, 2021) (“It
can take anywhere from six months to a couple of years [to donate a conservation easement].
Title issues and family agreements are often an important variable in this estimate.”).
47
Stephen J. Small, Appraisals and Valuations - How the Gift Is Valued, Library, LAND
CONSERVATION ASSISTANCE NETWORK, https://www.landcan.org/article/Appraisals-andValuations--How-the-Gift-is-Valued/201 [https://perma.cc/6EZK-SVY2] (last visited June
1, 2021).
48
Id.
49
See Nancy McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19
FLA. TAX REV. 225, 232 (2016), https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&
context=scholarship [https://perma.cc/2CB4-XG8N].
50
See Barbara T. Kaplan, G. Michelle Ferreira & Jennifer A. Vincent, Prepare for
Greater IRS Scrutiny on Conservation Easements, LAW360: EXPERT ANALYSIS (Dec. 4,
2019, 5:50 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/1224999/prepare-for-greater-irsscrutiny-on-conservation-easements [https://perma.cc/GU6G-PN3K] (“Generally, taxpayers
are limited in the amount of a charitable deduction they may utilize by a ceiling of 50% of
their adjusted gross income.”).
51
See Small, supra note 47 (demonstrating how some donations may be valued at
upwards of $1.5 million).
52
See Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3); I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(i)–(ii).
53
See Reg. § 1.170A–14(h)(3)(i).
54
See McLaughlin, supra note 49 (“However, because conservation and façade
easements are not bought and sold in true market transactions, and an easement’s restrictions
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after” method is used most often to determine the conservation easement’s value.55
But before this method can be used, appraisers first must determine the value of the
entire property itself.
There are three common approaches for determining property values: the sales
comparison approach, the income capitalization approach, and the reproduction cost
approach.56 The reproduction cost approach, which involves estimating the current
costs to reproduce or replace a property, applies mainly to historical sites and
structures, and thus will not be examined further. The other two approaches are
critical in conservation easement valuation and are examined in turn.
(a) The Sales Comparison Approach
The sales comparison approach compares the value of the property in question
with similar properties recently sold in the open market.57 An appraiser using this
approach must identify other property sales that meet the following criteria: “(1) the
properties must be similar to the subject property . . . ; (2) the sales must have been
arm’s-length transactions; and (3) the sales must have occurred within a reasonable
time of the valuation date.”58 The appraiser then makes adjustments based on the
differences between the compared properties and the property in question, including
size, location, and topography,59 and uses these adjustments to arrive at the
property’s estimated value. This approach is generally the most reliable indicator of
a property’s fair market value because courts and other scrutinizing parties can refer
to similar transactions, and thus have a baseline from which to compare the
appraiser’s estimated property value. Therefore, an appraisal that “claims that there
are no comparable sales with which to estimate . . . [the] value of a property . . .”
must be scrutinized more carefully.60
(b) The Income Capitalization Approach
The income capitalization approach estimates the subject property’s future cash
flow and discounts that value against the property’s present value.61 This approach
and the underlying property generally will be unique in some if not many respects, the sales
of comparable easements method is rarely (if ever) used.”).
55
See id. at 232–36.
56
See Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 677, 689–90 (1985).
57
See McLaughlin, supra note 49, at 236–38. This “sales comparison” approach should
not be confused with the “sales of comparable easements” method previously described,
which applies only to easement values and not the value of the property as a whole.
58
Id.
59
See id. (“Because no two sales and no two properties are ever identical, the appraiser
must then consider aspects of the comparable transactions, such as the size of the property,
its location, its topography, and other significant features, and make appropriate adjustments
for each aspect to approximate the qualities of the subject property.”).
60
Id.
61
See id.
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is arguably more complicated than the “sales comparison” approach, and the
appraiser is given substantial leeway in assuming a variety of factors or variables,
most of which are not easily compared to existing market data.62 A “subdivision
development” analysis is a variant of the “income capitalization” approach. The
subdivision development analysis assumes that the highest and best use of
undeveloped acreage is a subdivision of residential lots, and involves “estimating a
final sale price for the total number of lots into which the property could be divided
and then deducting all costs of development, including the developer’s anticipated
profit.”63 Because these approaches are highly speculative, neither is preferred when
comparable sales are available,64 but they are nevertheless utilized when valuating
property involved in syndicated conservation easement schemes.
3. Tax Deductions
Pursuant to I.R.C. § 170(h), once the value of the conservation easement is
determined and the easement donated, the value of that conservation easement is
deducted from the donor’s taxes. These donations are viewed as gifts, in part because
the donor intends “to relinquish the granted rights to the property permanently” for
preservation purposes, or purposes otherwise benefiting the public welfare.65
Essentially, if a landowner donates a conservation easement, the tax framework
recognizes this donation as a gift made to the public, and that landowner is rewarded
through tax benefits. When the landowner actually gifts their land for “conservation
purposes”66 and is “truly contributing . . . to the general environmental wellbeing of
the area,”67 then they have the donative intent that the conservation easement tax
framework was designed to promote. When the landowner lacks donative intent, or
is merely seeking a tax deduction by donating land with little or no conservation
value,68 then they abuse the conservation easement tax framework. The latter
scenario underlies the syndicated conservation easement, the tax scheme that
undermines the integrity of conservation easements and costs American taxpayers
billions annually.69

62

See id. at 238–39.
Id. at 239–40.
64
See id. at 238–41.
65
Ashbury, supra note 38, at 28.
66
I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(C).
67
Stephen J. Small, Test Your Knowledge of Conservation Purposes, Library, LAND
CONSERVATION ASSISTANCE NETWORK, https://www.landcan.org/article/Test-yourknowledge-of-Conservation-Purposes/180/ [https://perma.cc/J3PE-XFNM] (last visited
June 1, 2021).
68
See Looney, supra note 3 (“These deals often involve easements related to large real
estate developments (include private residential communities, country clubs, and golf
courses) or donations in high-cost areas like metropolitan suburbs and resort destinations.”).
69
See generally id. (arguing that syndicated conservation easements disproportionately
contribute to the rising federal cost of conservation easements).
63
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D. Syndicated Conservation Easements
The general “syndication scheme” 70 goes as follows: (1) a syndicated
conservation easement promoter (“syndicator”) forms a partnership using a limited
liability company (LLC); (2) drafts a deed for the conservation easement and
prepares baseline documentation; (3) hires an appraiser to provide an inflated or
flawed appraisal of the property of interest;71 (4) engages a law firm to provide a tax
opinion letter; (5) markets the LLC interests and sells them as securities to taxpayers
in high federal income tax brackets;72 (6) sells each stake in the LLC and donates
the land as a conservation easement; (7) prepares the LLC’s tax return and submit
copies to the invested taxpayers; and (8) those taxpayers file their income tax returns,
with the deductions resulting from the syndicated conservation easement.73 Because
the syndicator forms the LLC as a “pass-through entity,”74 the sizable tax deduction
resulting from the syndicated conservation easement is fractionalized among the
invested taxpayers, who each receive a substantial return in their investment in the
form of tax deductions.75

70

United States v. Zak, No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224114, at *4
(N.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2019).
71
See Kaplan et al., supra note 50 (“[P]roperty valuations and appraisals greatly inflate
the value of the easement based on unreasonable conclusions about the development
potential of the real estate.”); Stephen J. Small, Note #6: “Syndications” of Conservation
Easement Deductions, STEVE SMALL, https://www.stevesmall.com/note-6-syndicationsconservation-easement-deductions-theres-trouble-river-city/ [https://perma.cc/9LFE-AB3E]
(last visited June 1, 2021) (“A grossly inflated appraisal . . . changes the entire analysis of
the transaction.”); see also Jay Adkisson, The IRS Leaves a Lump of Coal for Syndicated
Conservation Easements In Notice 2017-10, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2016, 10:56 PM EST),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2016/12/27/the-irs-leaves-a-lump-of-coal-forsyndicated-conservation-easements-in-notice-2017-10/#2929fede6eb3 [https://perma.cc/
WUP2-FMBD] (describing the role of the “friendly property appraiser”).
72
See, e.g., Peter Elkind, The IRS Tried to Crack Down on Rich People Using an
“Abusive” Tax Deduction, PROPUBLICA: GUTTING THE IRS (Jan. 3, 2020, 5 AM EST),
https://www.propublica.org/article/the-irs-tried-to-crack-down-on-rich-people-using-anabusive-tax-deduction-it-hasnt-gone-so-well [https://perma.cc/8UV7-LQCM] (referencing a
Barron’s ad which reads: “TAX DEDUCTIONS AVAILABLE THROUGH
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS . . . 100,000 INVESTED YIELDS UP TO 600,000 IN
DEDUCTIONS.”).
73
See Complaint, United States v. Zak, No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
224114, at 18–22 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2019) for a full description of the entire syndicated
conservation easement scheme.
74
See Adkisson, supra note 71 (explaining how pass-through entities allow syndicators
to skirt around the IRS’ tax deduction limitations).
75
See Kaplan et al., supra note 50 (“Generally, the deductions claimed by investors in
these transactions . . . often generate deductions of up two and a half times the invested
amount.”).
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1. Efforts to Combat Syndicated Conservation Easements
Although syndicated conservation easements are confined to a limited number
of states,76 they nevertheless constitute a substantial portion of the overall costs
attributable to conservation easements.77 For this reason, the IRS, nonprofits, and
members of Congress are attempting to curb the practice entirely.
In 2003 and 2004, the Washington Post published a series of articles criticizing
the practice of syndicated conservation easements.78 Congress responded by
“tighten[ing] the requirements pertaining to appraisers [and] appraisals”79 while
enhancing the tax benefits offered to conservation easement donors.80 Soon after,
the IRS issued its first syndicated conservation easement-related notice to taxpayers
and began “aggressively auditing”81 suspect conservation easements.82 The LTA
also responded to the emergence of syndicated conservation easements by creating
a set of standards and practices for land trusts to follow.83 Today, the IRS continues
to scrutinize syndicated conservation easements, identifying the transaction as a “tax
scam to avoid”84 and enlisting three separate divisions (plus outside contractors) to
pursue “[e]very available enforcement option,”85 including civil penalties and
criminal prosecution. Moreover, the Senate Finance Committee is urging Congress,

76

See Looney, supra note 3 (“The 25 promoters of syndicated deals that [Brookings]
identified in 2015 and 2016 represent just seven states. Two-thirds of the companies they
manage are incorporated in Georgia, and almost all of the remaining entities reside in
Alabama, Florida, and North Carolina.”).
77
See id. (“The total revenue loss from syndications is likely somewhere between $1.0
billion and $1.9 billion in 2015, and between $1.3 billion and $2.4 billion in 2016.”).
78
See Cheever & McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 125 n.54 and accompanying text.
79
Id. at 126 (citing Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780, §§ 1213, 1219 (2006)).
80
See id. at 126–27 (“Illustrating Congress’s somewhat schizophrenic approach the §
170(h) deduction, however, the PPA also temporarily enhanced the tax benefits offered to
conservation easement donors by making the percentage limitations on the resulting
charitable deductions more favorable.”).
81
Id. at 127.
82
See generally IRS Notice 2004-41 (announcing the IRS’s investigation into
syndicated conservation easements).
83
See generally Land Trust Standards and Practices, LAND TR. ALLIANCE, [hereinafter
LTA Standards and Practices] https://www.landtrustalliance.org/topics/land-trust-standardsand-practices [https://perma.cc/FN4L-YCGD] (last visited June 1, 2021) (LTA’s standards
and practices reference guide).
84
Kaplan et al., supra note 50 (“These transactions are also included in IRS’ 2019 dirty
dozen list of scams to avoid.”).
85
News Release, IRS, IRS Increases Enforcement Action on Syndicated Conservation
Easements (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-increases-enforcementaction-on-syndicated-conservation-easements [https://perma.cc/BJJ9-4HG6].
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the IRS, and the Department of Treasury to take further actions “to preserve the
integrity of the conservation-easement tax deduction.”86
The IRS sometimes succeeds in uncovering syndicated conservation easement
schemes, and those involved in the transactions typically appear in court. In late
2019, the Department of Justice sued Georgia-based syndicators, alleging that the
defendants engaged in a syndicated conservation easement scheme that unlawfully
exploited the tax code and defrauded investors and the government.87 In 2020, the
IRS denied tax deductions and imposed substantial penalties on the wealthy
taxpayers who engaged in a syndicated conservation easement scheme. The
taxpayers subsequently filed a class action lawsuit against the CPA firm who set up
the transaction, alleging that the firm conspired with other firms and property
appraisers to develop the syndicated conservation easement.88 Past rulings suggest
that the court recognizes the abusive nature of syndicated conservation easements
and punishes syndicators accordingly,89 though “over 80 other [syndicated
conservation easement] cases remain pending in Tax Court . . . .”90
While there are no penalties specific to syndicated conservation easement
schemes, there are penalties for taxpayers who overstate the value of conservation
easements and for appraisers who assist them in doing so. After the Pension

86

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE UNITED STATES SENATE, SYNDICATED CONSERVATION
EASEMENT TRANSACTIONS, S. Prt. 116-44 (Aug. 2020), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/SFC%20-%20Syndicated%20Conservation-Easement%20Transactions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DCC8-FD5Y]; COMMITTEE ON FINANCE UNITED STATES SENATE,
SYNDICATED CONSERVATION EASEMENT TRANSACTIONS, Exhibits 1-133, S. Prt. 116-44
(Aug. 2020), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFC%20-%20Syndicated%20
Conservation-Easement%20Transactions%20Exhibits.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC3J-DESD];
See also News Release, Senate Finance Committee, Finance Committee Releases Report on
Syndicated
Conservation-Easement
Transactions
(Aug.
25,
2020),
https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/finance-committee-releases-report-onsyndicated-conservation-easement-transactions [https://perma.cc/S82W-DADT].
87
United States v. Zak, No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1365 (N.D. Ga. Dec.
10, 2019).
88
See Jay Adkisson, Alleged Syndicated Conservation Easement Tax Shelter Promoters
Face Class-Action Lawsuit, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2020, 12:55 PM EDT),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2020/03/28/alleged-syndicated-conservationeasement-tax-shelter-promoters-face-class-action-lawsuit/#ab6efc05c564 [https://perma.cc/
F7FW-FMQR] (citing Jury Demand, Lechter v. Aprio, L.L.P., No. 1:20-mi-99999-UNA,
Document 918 (Dist. Ct. N.D. Atlanta Div., Ga. filed Mar. 26, 2020),
https://assetprotectionbook.com/casedocs/conservation_easements/Aprio_Class_Action_C
omplaint_200326.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXN8-MY8N]).
89
See, e.g., Wendell Falls Dev. v. Comm’r, No. 3494-14, T.C. Memo 2018-193 (T.C.,
Nov. 20, 2018) (holding that taxpayers receive no tax deduction for easements donated for
park use, when their highest and best use is park use); Graev v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 377 (2013)
(holding that taxpayers receive no tax deduction when donating conservation easements
solely for tax benefits).
90
Kaplan et al., supra note 50.
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Protection Act of 2006,91 taxpayers are subject to a 20 percent penalty if the stated
value of the conservation easement was 150 percent higher than the correct value (a
“substantial valuation misstatement”), and a 40 percent penalty if the stated value of
the conservation easement was 200 percent higher than the correct value (a “gross
valuation misstatement”).92 Tax Courts typically are capable of computing a
conservation easement’s correct value.93 Appraisers, on the other hand, may receive
a penalty of 125 percent, maximum, of the gross income derived from a substantial
or gross valuation statement, but liability may be avoided if the appraiser can show
that it was “more likely than not” that the appraisal was correct.94 Additionally,
appraisers may be “blacklisted,” meaning “the appraiser’s appraisals will have no
probative effect in any administrative proceeding before the Treasury or the IRS and
bar such appraiser from presenting evidence or testimony in any such proceeding.”95
Members of Congress have tried to pass a bill that would further disincentivize
wealthy taxpayers from engaging in syndicated conservation easement schemes. The
Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act of 2019 (CCEPIA)96
would add a new paragraph to IRC § 170(h)97 that effectively limits the amount an
investor can receive in conservation easement tax deductions. According to the Joint
Committee on Tax, the bill may generate up to $6.6 billion in federal revenue.98 The
current bill has failed to garner mainstream support in the Senate, though many
charitable organizations with a stake in conservation easements strongly support its
passage.99

91

Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
See Kaufman v. Comm’r (Kaufman I), T.C. Memo 2014-52 at 387, aff’d Kaufman
v. Commissioner (Kaufman II), 784 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2015); see also McLaughlin, supra
note 49, at 247 (describing taxpayer penalties for the purposes of the § 170(h) deduction).
93
See McLaughlin, supra note 49, at 247 (discussing how tax courts found gross
valuation statements on multiple occasions).
94
I.R.C. § 6695A(b); see also McLaughlin, supra note 49, at 248–49 (describing
appraiser penalties for the purposes of the § 170(h) deduction).
95
McLaughlin, supra note 49, at 249 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 330(c) (2015)); see also
Practice Before the Department, 31 U.S.C. § 330(b) (2015).
96
Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act of 2019, S. 170, 116th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
97
I.R.C. § 170(h).
98
See Press Release, LTA, Allies Call for Immediate Passage of Charitable
Conservation
Easement
Program
Integrity
Act
(Dec.
11,
2019),
https://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trust-alliance-allies-call-immediate-passage-charitab
le-conservation-easement-program-integrity [https://perma.cc/73UB-XV3N] (referencing
statements made by the nonpartisan Joint Committee on Tax).
99
See id. (listing each charitable organization that supports the CCEPIA).
92
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The IRS: A Toothless Tiger
While the IRS continues to combat syndicated conservation easements, the
agency has gained little traction in curtailing the issue, likely because most of its
power derives from audits and Tax Court, both of which require abundant resources
and time.100
Syndicated conservation easement schemes are not the only abusive tax
practices that the IRS has targeted with a special task force. In 2009, the IRS
employed a similar tactic to uncover abusive tax maneuvers from high-profile
business magnates but ultimately stopped short after nearly a decade of auditing,
eventually settling for only a small fraction of its intended penalties and back
taxes.101 Efforts like this demonstrate the myriad challenges the IRS faces when
auditing ultrawealthy taxpayers, in part because those taxpayers have abundant
financial resources to afford “the best legal and accounting talent” to help guide
them in their potentially abusive practices and defend them whenever the IRS takes
notice.102 Indeed, these lawyers and accountants aid taxpayers in creating complex
tax schemes that may take the IRS years just to “understand a transaction and deem
it to be a violation.”103 In effect, wealthy taxpayers have the ability to “steamroll tax
laws,”104 aiding the notion that current auditing practices are insufficient in
addressing syndicated conservation easement schemes. This problem is exacerbated
by the fact that Congress continues to cut IRS funding, weakening the agency’s
ability to carry out full audits and investigations.105
Syndicators design syndicated conservation easement schemes in a way that
accounts for IRS auditing efforts and ultimately protects the invested wealthy
taxpayers from facing the brunt of penalties and punishments. Because billions of
dollars are at stake each year in the form of tax deductions, syndicate organizers
100

See generally Elkind, supra note 72 (arguing that the IRS’s efforts ultimately fail to
slow the growth of syndicated conservation easements).
101
See Jesse Eisenger & Paul Kiel, The IRS Tried to Take on the Ultrawealthy. It Didn’t
Go So Well., PROPUBLICA (Apr. 5, 2019 5:00 AM EDT), https://www.propublica.org/article
/ultrawealthy-taxes-irs-internal-revenue-service-global-high-wealth-audits [https://perma.cc
/7SYS-CDD8] (discussing how such long and contentious audits yield only small amounts
of penalties and back taxes).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See, e.g., Robert Frank, How Congress Made It Easier to Avoid the IRS, CNBC (Jan.
14, 2020, 2:00 PM EST), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/14/why-congress-made-it-easierto-avoid-the-irs.html [https://perma.cc/Y5WM-H6US] (providing data that show a 21%
decline in IRS funding since 2010); Paul Kiel & Jesse Eisinger, How the IRS Was Gutted,
PROPUBLICA (Dec. 11, 2018, 5:00 AM EST), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-theirs-was-gutted [https://perma.cc/KVJ5-HNMF] (arguing that the IRS’s funding deficit favors
corporations and the wealthy).

2022]

A SAND COUNTY TAX SHELTER

229

accept the risk of being audited by the IRS and build “audit reserves”106 and/or “audit
insurance” into their budget. Since most syndicated conservation easements appear
legal on paper, anything less than a full audit of the transaction likely will not reveal
an abuse of the tax system. As mentioned previously, it may take the IRS years of
auditing a single transaction to determine whether a violation occurred. Even if the
IRS successfully uncovers a syndicated conservation easement scheme through an
audit, the “deals are structured in a way that insulate[s] the wealthy individual
investors,”107 meaning that the lawyers and sponsors are left to deal with much of
the legal battle in tax court, rather than the wealthy taxpayers who ultimately reap
the benefits from the abusive tax practice.
For these reasons, the IRS’s current efforts against syndicated conservation
easements are insufficient, especially considering the financial power syndicators
wield108 and the amount that the wealthy taxpayers stand to gain in the form of tax
benefits.109 Since syndicated conservation easements primarily abuse the tax
framework through grossly inflated appraisals that lead to overstated tax deductions,
the IRS should devote most of its conservation easement auditing resources to
investigating appraisers and appraisals.
Currently, the IRS compiles and publishes an annual list of tax scams to
avoid.110 The IRS may consider creating a similar database of appraisers who have
made substantial or gross valuation statements in past conservation easement
transactions. Specifically, any appraiser who has been “blacklisted” pursuant to 31
U.S.C. §§ 330(b)–(c) is added to this appraiser database. Consequently, any
transactions involving these listed appraisers are immediately suspect and subject to
more stringent IRS scrutiny. As the current law stands, appraisers are potentially
liable for only a 125 percent maximum penalty when making substantial or gross
valuation statements, and they often avoid this liability by passing a low bar standard
of showing a reasonable belief that their appraisal was accurate. While a database of
blacklisted appraisers would not increase appraiser penalties, it could nevertheless
provide the IRS with a more streamlined method of identifying suspect conservation
easement transactions, thus conserving auditing resources and expediting IRS
auditing efforts overall.
The IRS is taking measures to more quickly identify flawed appraisals by
breaking down procedural safeguards that otherwise protect appraisers against
106

Elkind, supra note 72.
Id.
108
See id. (referencing SCE advocacy groups (i.e., Partnership for Conservation,
EcoVest) who spent up to $5 million in lobbying).
109
See Press Release, LTA, Land Trust Alliance Statement on Updated IRS Data
Regarding Abusive Conservation Easement Tax Shelters (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trust-alliance-statement-updated-irs-data-regardingabusive-conservation-easement-tax-shelters [https://perma.cc/PX39-DHWN] (referencing
data from 2016 and 2017 that show approximately $13 billion in deductions).
110
IRS, Dirty Dozen, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/dirty-dozen [https://perma.cc/RP
P6-MHHM] (last visited June 1, 2021) (“The Dirty Dozen represents the worst of the tax
scams.”).
107
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penalties and disciplinary referrals.111 In the past, an IRS appraiser would
recommend to a Revenue Agent penalties against an appraiser for valuation
misstatements; that recommendation would undergo an extensive, multitiered
review process before the Revenue Agent could consider it.112 Recently, the IRS
eliminated this multitiered review process, now allowing the Revenue Agent to
consider violations once an IRS appraiser’s recommendation receives approval from
their immediate supervisor.113 Some argue that this measure provides too much
discretion to IRS Revenue Agents, who likely have little experience in or knowledge
of the valuation process.114 Despite those limitations, this measure signals a shift in
IRS auditing practices, suggesting that the agency is taking necessary aggressive
steps toward uncovering flawed appraisals.
Ultimately, an appraisal database compiled by the IRS, paired with the agency’s
recent changes to appraiser penalties, may fulfill syndicated conservation easement
enforcement objectives. For one, this database would disincentivize appraisers from
providing substantial or gross valuation statements because their susceptibility to
penalties is greater. Second, this database would limit the amount of substantial or
gross valuation statements because blacklisted appraisers realize their appraisals
warrant heightened scrutiny, and thus would be less willing to make substantial or
gross valuation statements. Furthermore, wealthy taxpayers seeking tax deductions
would be less willing to work with blacklisted appraisers because the IRS could
more easily uncover a syndicated conservation easement scheme involving a
blacklisted appraiser. Moreover, syndicators would have fewer appraisers to draw
from when executing these fraudulent transactions.
While more efficient IRS auditing measures that target appraisers and
appraisals will likely slow the rate of syndicated conservation easement schemes,
this alone will not curb the practice entirely. Instead, penalties leveled against
taxpayers and appraisers must be harsher overall, and the IRS must actually pursue
this line of enforcement against syndicators.
In June 2020, the IRS offered a limited-time settlement program to taxpayers
with pending docketed Tax Court cases relating to syndicated conservation

111

I.R.S. Int. Gdnc. Memo. LB&I-20-0120-001 (Jan. 22, 2020) https://www.irs.gov/
pub/foia/ig/lmsb/lbi-20-0120-0001.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8QP-MD5N].
112
Hale E. Shepard, Conservation Easement Enforcement: IRS Quietly Eliminates
Procedural Protections for Appraisers, J. OF TAXATION 17, 25 (May 2020),
https://www.chamberlainlaw.com/assets/htmldocuments/IRS%20removes%20procedural%
20protection%20for%20appraisers.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WJN-JPYV] (citing IRM
20.1.12.7.4) (“Following the former process from start to finish, the IRS would not assess . . .
penalties against an appraiser until the matter had been considered by at least five separate,
experienced IRS employees.”).
113
See id.
114
See id. at 26 (arguing that IRC § 6695(a) Penalty Case Reviews may be troublesome
for partnerships and appraisers).
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easements.115 The settlement terms include: disallowing any deduction resulting
from the syndicated conservation easement; allowing a deduction of the amount the
invested taxpayers invested toward the scheme, but also requiring them to pay a
reduced penalty; and disallowing sponsors and other similar parties any deductions
of cost and requiring them to pay the maximum penalty.116 This settlement program
may help clear up current syndicated conservation easement-related cases in the Tax
Court docket, but the IRS needs to pursue more aggressive penalties against both the
taxpayers and sponsors of syndicated conservation easement schemes once they are
in court. The language in the settlement does require parties to agree to several
important caveats, including allowing the IRS to seek further penalties and conduct
criminal investigations,117 but this remains merely prospective because the IRS has
yet to pursue criminal penalties or sanctions against any parties engaging in
conservation easement syndications.118
It is unclear why prosecutors have yet to bring criminal charges against
syndicators. Tax evasion is a felony after all,119 and those engaging in syndicated

115
I.R.S. News Release, IR-2020-130 (June 25, 2020) [hereinafter IRS Offers
Settlement],
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-offers-settlement-for-syndicatedconservation-easements-letters-being-mailed-to-certain-taxpayers-with-pending-litigation
[https://perma.cc/2MXD-Z8LY].
116
See id. The IRS announced its first settlement under the program in August 2020,
with Coal Property Holdings, LLC, a Tennessee-based syndicate. See also I.R.S. News
Release, IR-2020-196: Settlements Begin in Syndicated Conservation Easement Transaction
Initiative (Aug. 31, 2020) [hereinafter Settlements Begin], https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/
settlements-begin-in-syndicated-conservation-easement-transaction-initiative [https://perm
a.cc/9ERM-P7KP].
117
IRS Offers Settlement, supra note 115; I.R.S. Notice CC-2021-001, 10 (Oct. 1,
2020) (“Neither this settlement initiative, nor any settlement executed therefrom, will have
any effect, limitation, or prohibition against the IRS asserting promoter, material advisor,
appraiser, or return preparer penalties, discipline under Circular 230, or any other penalty,
addition to tax, or additional amount. Execution of a Closing Agreement under this initiative
does not preclude the IRS from investigating any associated criminal conduct or
recommending prosecution for violation of any criminal statute.”).
118
Despite its first announced settlement with Coal Property Holdings, LLC, the IRS
has yet to pursue any further penalties against the syndicate. However, it may be too early to
determine whether the IRS actually will take advantage of the “further penalties” terms built
into the settlement agreement. See Settlements Begin, supra note 116. The Dept. of Justice
has filed a complaint against Georgia-based syndicators. See generally Complaint, U.S. v.
Zak et al., No. 1:18-cv-05774-AT (N.D. Ga., Dec. 18, 2018). But the complaint seeks only
injunctions and disgorgement of profits, rather than criminal penalties. See id. Two class
action suits have been filed against syndicators. See generally Lechter et al. v. Aprio, LLP,
et al. No. 1:20-cv—01325-AT (N.D. Ga. March 26, 2020); Turk et al. v. Morris, Manning &
Martin, LLP, et al. No. 1:20-cv-02815-AT (N.D. Ga. July 3, 2020). Whether the syndicators
will be found criminally liable remains to be seen.
119
26 U.S.C. § 7201.
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conservation easement schemes likely meet the elements of evasion of assessment120
because these schemes rely on overvalued conservation easements that create
inflated tax deduction values. In other words, the taxpayers engaging in these
schemes are not actually entitled to all of the deductions that they claim through
syndicated conservation easements. Therefore, it is somewhat likely that syndicate
groups may be liable for tax evasion at the very least. While the IRS may pursue this
line of argument through its settlement program, the agency has yet to do so.
Regardless, the IRS can pursue the “further penalties” option only when parties
agree to settlements.121 This creates a perverse incentive for those engaged in
particularly flagrant conservation easement syndication schemes; why would a
syndicate group agree to settle when doing so would open it up to criminal
investigations? As such, there likely are many syndicated conservation easement
parties that will choose not to engage in settlements, instead choosing to battle it out
through Tax Court and, at worst, receive appraiser penalties.
As it stands now, the punishment for those engaged in syndicated conservation
easement schemes remains inadequate and likely fails in deterring parties from
participating in these schemes.
B. Shortcomings of the Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act
The thrust of the CCEPIA is important because it targets wealthy taxpayers and
limits their ability to receive a quick profit from syndicated conservation
easements,122 but its effectiveness would be limited because it fails to address several
key underlying causes.

120

Id. (“Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by
law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000
($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution.”). Evasion of assessment is a category of tax evasion, and the
“willful attempt in any manner to evade or defeat any tax . . . .” See Sansone v. United States,
380 U.S. 343, 354 (1965).
121
See Dylan Moroses, Several IRS Divisions Probing Conservation Easement Abuse,
LAW360: TAX AUTHORITY (Nov. 12, 2019, 6:14 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/taxauthority/articles/1219136/several-irs-divisions-probing-conservation-easement-abuse
[https://perma.cc/TD2U-H8UD].
122
See Charitable Conservation Easement Program Integrity Act of 2019, S. 170, 116th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (limiting the aggregate amount of a partner’s annual tax deductions
for qualified conservation contributions of a partnership to 2.5 times the partner’s adjusted
basis in the partnership).

2022]

A SAND COUNTY TAX SHELTER

233

1. Uniformity in State Law
Despite many states incorporating some form of conservation easement-related
tax law into their statutes,123 such laws still vary from state to state. This may explain
why a majority of syndicated conservation easements occur in only a small minority
of states,124 where state tax codes make financial incentives for conservation
easement donors greater125 or less demanding than conservation easement
requirements in other states.126 Congress should also consider legislation that would
incentivize states to follow a uniform set of guidelines for conservation easement
tax incentives. For instance, if a state follows federal guidelines, it will receive
federal funds for acquiring trail easements and open space. Such legislation would
not only encourage uniformity in state-based conservation easement tax law, but
also promote states to pursue conservation easement transactions that are both
transparent and accessible to the public.
2. A Legally Mandated Set of Standards and Practices
The CCEPIA fails to address how charitable organizations are not required by
law to follow standards and practices for conservation easement transactions.
Although the LTA oversees a robust accreditation program,127 participation is
merely voluntary, and none of the biggest syndicated conservation easement
perpetrators are accredited.128 This problem could be addressed by further tightening
the requirements of a “qualified organization,”129 such as capping conservation
easement tax deductions at a low ceiling unless donated through an LTA-accredited
organization. This requirement would disincentivize syndicators from working
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structure, and habitat function . . . ,” among other stewardship responsibilities. Id.).
127
See Christina Soto, The Impact of Accreditation, SAVING LAND MAGAZINE (Winter
2019), https://www.landtrustalliance.org/news/impact-accreditation [https://perma.cc/SZJ7XR8R] (summarizing the scope of LTA’s accreditation program).
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around LTA’s widely accepted standards and practices130 and (based on the
abundance of LTA-accredited land trusts across the country)131 likely would not
pose a barrier to entry for well-intentioned conservation donors from donating
valuable land.
3. Heightened Scrutiny Toward Appraisals
Syndicated conservation easement schemes abuse the tax framework through
grossly inflated appraisals. Much to the disadvantage of auditors, “[c]onservation
easement appraisals are described by some in the business as part art and part
science, with appraisal results varying with the appraiser’s expertise and chosen
methodology.”132 As a result, appraisers have abundant discretion in determining the
value of a proposed conservation easement donation, a major advantage for
syndicators. To prevent appraisers from providing grossly inflated property
appraisals, a third-party panel (e.g., the IRS, the United States Committee on
Finance, etc.) should automatically review the valuation of any conservation
easement donation that meets a certain tax value threshold. This practice would
provide neutral oversight of the valuation process and likely deter “friendly property
appraisers” from abusing their discretion.133 At the very least, this practice could
help the IRS streamline its auditing efforts toward high-value conservation easement
donations and more quickly uncover some of the larger syndicated conservation
easement transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Syndicated conservation easements cost taxpayers billions of dollars each year.
For stakeholders working to curb the practice, no obvious panacea exists. However,
if the IRS reworks its overall strategy in combatting syndicated conservation
easements, and Congress hones in on appraisals and passes legislation that promotes
both state tax law uniformity and legally-mandated standards and practices, then the
conservation easement may be restored to its original purpose—private land
conservation for the public good.
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